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In their survey of the literature on ethnic fractionalization and economic performance, Alesina 
and La Ferrara (JEL 2005) identify two main directions for future research. One is to improve 
the measurement of diversity and the other to treat diversity as an endogenous variable. This 
paper tries to address these two issues: it investigates the effects of ethnic fractionalization 
on economic growth across countries using unique time-varying measures. We first replicate 
the finding of a weak effect of exogenous diversity on growth and then we show that 
accounting for how diversity changes over time and treating it as an endogenous variable 
makes a difference. Once diversity is instrumented (with lagged diversity and latitude), it 
shows a significant negative impact on economic growth which is robust to different 
specifications, polarization measures, econometric estimators, as well as to the use of an 
index of ethnic-religious-linguistic fractionalization. 
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1. Introduction 
There are three fundamental dimensions to any process of change. One is timing. 
When change starts and when it ends matters. Detecting the first signs that the status 
quo is sliding away is as difficult as identifying the moment when the previous status 
quo  ceased  to  exist  and  the  new  one  has  fully  established  itself.  The  second 
fundamental  dimension  is  extent.  It  refers  to  how  much  change  was  actually 
accomplished,  whether  the  change  itself  was  deliberate  or  unintended.  The  ratio 
between these first two dimensions is the speed of change. The third fundamental 
dimension is depth. This refers to how deep the effects of change turn out to be, 
whether or not the original change itself was intentional. There is no reason to think of 
these three dimensions as independent from each other. A case in point is that deep 
causes of change are often the most difficult ones to time, measure and attribute. Of 
course, this does not make them less important (the opposite is true, if anything). 
Institutions are a good example. They change slowly, over long periods of time, but 
their  effects  are  widespread,  long-lasting,  and  deep.  We  argue  that  the  degree  of 
fractionalization of a society along ethnic, religious or linguistic lines is in the same 
category. Fractionalization changes very slowly but this does not mean it does not 
change. It is also very difficult to measure but this does not mean they are short-lived. 
And diversity is often an extraordinarily deep phenomenon, but this does not mean we 
can afford to ignore it.  
It  was  only  in  the  last  decade  or  so  that  ethnic  fractionalization  entered 
mainstream economics. There is now a burgeoning theoretical literature (see, e.g., 
Esteban  and  Ray,  1994,  1999,  and  Nehring  and  Puppe,  2002)  and  a  very  active 
empirical agenda. Although the seminal papers of Mauro (1995) and Easterly and 
Levine  (1997)  offer  econometric  evidence  showing  that  greater  levels  of  ethno-  2 
linguistic fractionalization hinder economic performance, there has been less success 
in sustaining the evidence for such negative, direct effect. Easterly (2001) argues that 
the effect of ethnic fractionalization is conditional: it slows down economic activity 
only in countries with “sufficiently bad” institutions. Bluedorn (2001) and Alesina, 
Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, and Wacziarg (2003) show that the negative impact 
of  diversity  on  growth  is  particularly  strong  in  less  democratic  countries.  Posner 
(2004) argues that the negative effect is supported only by a restricted polarization 
index: restricted in that it includes only “politically relevant” ethnic groups. Montalvo 
and  Reynal-Querol  (2005a)  argue  that  the  direct  effect  of  fractionalization  on 
economic  performance  is  weak  and  suggest  focusing  on  polarization  instead.  In 
summary, the initial negative first-order effect of ethnic diversity on economic growth 
has been challenged and the literature seems to have turned to identifying the main 
channels through which diversity may affect the economy (i.e., indirect effects).  
This large body of econometric evidence has two main features in common: 
diversity is measured using secondary data and diversity is often treated as a non-time 
varying, exogenous variable.
1 Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) provide an authoritative 
and thorough review of this empirical evidence and identify two main directions for 
future research: one is the need to improve the measurement of diversity and the other 
is the desirability of modeling diversity as an endogenous variable. The objective of 
this paper is to try to address these two issues. In this paper, we put together a data set 
                                                            
 
1 These two features are related as the secondary data used to measure diversity refers to the 
early 1960s. The huge popularity of the index constructed by Soviet researchers and published 
in the Atlas Narodov Mira (Bruk and Apenchenko, 1964) is due in large part to its inclusion 
in  Taylor  and  Hudson’s  World  Handbook  of  Political  and  Social  Indicators  (1972).  For 
studies that use this index, see Mauro (1995), Easterly and Levine (1997), Collier (2001), La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1999) and Woo (2003a, 2003b).    3 
that contains mostly primary, census-based, data. In terms of treating diversity as an 
endogenous  variable,  we  make  use  of  the  genuine  time  variation  shown  by  these 
indexes that, to the best of our knowledge, is unique to our data set. We propose 
lagged  diversity  and  latitude  as  the  instrument  set  and  subject  these  to  a 
comprehensive series of diagnostics tests (which they pass).   
 In  what  follows  we  report  on  the  construction  of  a  unique  data  set  based 
mostly on primary data (national censuses) to measure ethnic diversity over time for a 
sample  of  countries  that  closely  resemble  a  “natural  experiment”  (the  26  former 
centrally-planned  economies,  from  1989  to  2007).
2  These  are  said  to  resemble  a 
“natural experiment” because until 1989 they shared a very similar set of economic 
and political institutions (central planning under socialism), but have since followed 
radically different economic and political trajectories. Using these data, we are able to 
replicate the most recent results from the literature and show that static (exogenous) 
diversity is indeed not robustly correlated with economic growth. However, when we 
capture  empirically  how  ethnic  diversity  changes  over  time  and  model  it  as  an 
endogenous variable, we conclude that ethnic fractionalization is negatively related to 
growth and this is robust to the use of different econometric estimators, specifications, 
polarization  measures  as  well  as  to  an  index  of  ethnic-linguistic-religious 
fractionalization.    
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data 
collection  effort  and  the  measurement  methods  used.  Section  3  discusses  the 
econometric  methodology,  presents  the  main  results  and  subjects  them  to  various 
robustness tests. Section 4 concludes with some brief suggestions for future research. 
                                                            
2    Campos  and  Kuzeyev  (2007)  examine  the  relationship  between  growth  and  diversity 
between 1989 and 2002 within an endogenous growth framework, while this paper uses the 
traditional Solow model to study the growth-diversity nexus between 1989 and 2007.   4 
2.  Measurement 
In  this  paper,  we  collect  primary  data  (census-based)  to  measure  ethnic  diversity 
(fractionalization and polarization) over time (from 1989 to 2007) for a sample of 26 
former centrally-planned economies.
3 National censuses are the preferred and most 
reliable source of ethnic diversity data. Unfortunately they are only conducted once a 
decade, at best. Micro-censuses and demographic surveys, which  are  arguably the 
second  best  sources  of  primary  diversity  data,  tend  to  be  conducted  at  five-year 
intervals. With this in mind, we assess what would be the maximum number of time 
periods  for  which  we  could  obtain  a  balanced  panel  data  set  on  the  demographic 
(ethnic) composition of these 26 transition countries. We identify four time periods: 
1989-1993, 1994-1998, 1999-2002, and 2003-2007. This means we use primary data 
from national censuses for the first and third period and data from micro-censuses and 
demographic surveys for the second and fourth period.
4 
We collect data on the percentage of the population belonging to each ethnic 
group in each country for each of these four periods. This generates a panel with 104 
                                                            
3  We divided the sample in five groups for exposition purposes (Figure 1). The transition 
countries  in  ASIA  are  Armenia,  Azerbaijan,  Georgia,  Kazakhstan,  Kyrgyztan,  Mongolia, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The BALKAN countries are Albania, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Macedonia, Moldova and Romania. The BALTIC countries are Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania. The group called BUR comprises Belarus, Ukraine and Russia. The VISEGRAD 
countries are the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. CEEB stands for 
Central and Eastern European and Baltic countries and which is the sum of the BALTIC, 
BALKAN and VISEGRAD sub-groups. 
4 Although it is difficult to objectively judge the quality of these different sources of data, note 
that in each country collection of these data was done by the same agency, with comparable 
methodologies. They differ in that censuses cover the entire population and micro-censuses 
cover a representative sample. These figures were checked against various additional sources, 
including Rosenko (1999) Nasii I Etnosi V Sovremennom Mire (Nations and Ethnicity in 
Today’s World) and Natsionalniy Sostav Naseleniya SSSR (Ethnic Composition in The USSR,   5 
observations. Census data are available for about half of the observations.
 Once all the 
data  were  collected,  we  note  that  for  some  countries  there  were  more  than  one 
estimate  for  a  given  time  period,  so  a  decision  rule  was  needed.  If  two  or  more 
sources gave identical information up to the third decimal place, we first single out 
these sources. From them, we chose the combination that gave the most balanced 
distance among the indices over time. This was done to have the largest possible time 
span within the sample periods.
5 If we still have a tie, that is, if the remaining sources 
diverged up to the second decimal place, we used the one that caused less variability 
of  the  indices  for  the  country  in  question  over  time.  This  rule  of  most  balanced 
distance attempts to minimize source-variability bias as much as possible. 
  For the computation of the fractionalization indices, we apply the commonly 
used formula capturing the probability that two randomly selected individuals belong 





2 1                 (1)  
where si is the share of total population belonging to ethnic group i. The index takes 
values between zero (for a perfectly ethnically homogeneous country) and one (highly 
heterogeneous country).  
One  shortcoming  of  this  measure  is  that  the  same  value  of  the  index  can 
correspond to different distributions (Fearon, 2003).
 This sensitivity of the index to 
the  total  number  of  underlying  groups  requires  attention.  We  compare  two 
approaches. First, we use an unrestricted set with all disaggregated data allowing the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Finansi I Statistika, 1991). 
5 For example, we found data on the ethnic composition of the population in Latvia for the 
years 1994, 1995 and 1996 from different sources, whose indices were identical up to third 
decimal place. Hence, according to our rule, the time series 1989-1994-2000 was preferred to 
1989-1996-2000.   6 
number of ethnic groups for each country to vary over time. In the second approach, 
we restrict the number of groups for each country to be the same over time.
6 We find 
the differences are small.
7  
Figure 1 shows that these countries end up much more ethnically homogenous 
than they started with over a short period of time. This suggests that there may be 
value in re-thinking the assumption of exogeneity. Why does diversity change over 
time? One general cause is, of course, migration flows. These may be driven by better 
economic  performance  and  opportunities  in  the  destination  country  as  well  as  by 
inferior economic performance and/or civil war  and ethnic cleansing in the origin 
country. In developing countries, such a process should surely take decades to unfold. 
However, there are special circumstances in our sample of transition countries which 
allow for this process to take place in a much shorter period of time. Firstly, with the 
collapse of communism, workers become free to move to other countries (while under 
communism mobility restrictions often referred to the city, let alone country) in search 
                                                            
 
6  The  average  number  of  ethnic  groups  in  the  restricted  sample  was  5.19  and  in  the 
unrestricted sample 7.04. Alesina et al.’s and Fearon’s analogous figures for Eastern Europe 
and former Soviet Union countries are 6.48 (27 observations) and 4.55 (31 observations), 
respectively. The lowest number of groups in our data, including “others”, is 3 (in several 
cases), while the largest is 8 (12 for Mongolia in the unrestricted sample). In addition to data 
quality, we must also be concerned with data comparability. In this respect, there are few 
dimensions over which researchers can exert some control. One of the few, however, refers to 
the number of groups used in the computation of the diversity indexes. Here we explore 
different ways of using this information across countries and over time. We find that these 
variations do not affect our main conclusions. 
7 For instance, the mean of this ethnic fractionalization index declines from 0.3726 (0.3768) in 
the first period to 0.345 (0.3538) in the second period to 0.3147 (0.3154) in third period to 
0.30145 (0.30314) in the fourth period (values using the unrestricted number of groups are in 
parenthesis).  For  comparison,  Alesina  et  al.’s  value  for  the  early  1990s  is  0.3696,  while 
Fearon’s is 0.3723.   7 
of  better  economic  opportunities  (Campos  and  Coricelli,  2002).  Secondly,  the 
ubiquitous Russian minorities seem to have been made to feel unwelcome and the 
new economic and political situation after 1991 results in return migration, causing 
the share of Russians to fall in every country in our sample, with the exception of 
Moldova.
 It is only after 1945 that Russians become the second largest ethnic group in 
most of the Republics (one example is Kazakhstan, where the national census of 1989 
shows that the shares in total population are 37.8% to 39.7% for Russians and for 
Kazakhs, respectively.) A third important factor is violent conflict, for example, the 
wars in the Caucasus and former Yugoslavia. Because of the latter, for example, the 
share of Serbs in Croatia declines from 12.2% in 1991 to 4.54% in 2001.
  
Another concern about the existing ethnic fractionalization indices is that the 
definition of ethnic groups may change for political reasons. Alesina et al. (2003) 
remark that Somalia was counted as a homogeneous country prior to the civil war in 
1991 with the notion of linking clans to ethnic groups coming into being only after 
that.  Note that there  are no disputes about  group definitions in our data. Census 
questionnaires  enumerate  a  fixed  number  of  ethnic  groups  and  let  the  respondent 
indicate to which she belongs. The residual option of “others” or “none of the above” 
is  provided  and  taken  into  account  (as  one  single  group)  when  computing  our 
diversity measures. 
The emerging consensus is that polarization is the theoretically appropriate 
concept for measuring diversity.
8 The family of polarization measures developed by 
Esteban  and  Ray  (1994,  1999)  has  been  implemented  in  various  ways.  The  one 
proposed by Alesina et al. (2003) is as follows: 
                                                            
8  Fractionalization measures increase in the number of groups, while polarization maximum 
is reached with two groups of equal size.   8 
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where K is a scaling factor and α is a constant between 0 and 1.6. Note that this 
formulation requires a measure of distance between groups (the last term in the right-
hand side). Conceptually, distance can be thought of, for instance, as differences in 
median  incomes.  Because  of  data  constraints,  distance  is  often  assumed  to  be 
constant.
9 
An alternative, yet related, implementation is the one proposed by Montalvo 
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  Notice that although Esteban and Ray (1994) and Montalvo and Reynal-
Querol (2005) may look similar they are rather different.
10 Esteban and Ray deal with 
the calculation of polarization when distances  are continuous while Montalvo and 
Reynal-Querol provide an index to calculate polarization when distances are discrete. 
We  use  equations  (1),  (2),  and  (3)  to  calculate  various  measures  of 
fractionalization and polarization. Appendix 1 shows that the pair-wise correlations 
between our measures, on the one hand, and investment, human capital and labor 
growth  rates,  on  the  other,  is  small  (the  largest  is  .11).  Notice  that  the  simple 
correlation  among  our  measures  of  fractionalization  and  polarization  is  high  (the 
smallest is .83). It is also worth noting that while the correlation coefficients between 
our diversity measures and human capital tend to be positive, the same with respect to 
investment and population growth tend to be negative (although in both cases they are 
                                                            
9  To be more precise, the ADEKW index of polarization is the original index of polarization 
of Esteban and Ray (1994). The Alesina et al. (2003) index are obtained using different values 
of α and under the assumption that distance is constant and equal to 1.   9 
not  statistically  significant).  In  between  these  extremes,  the  negative  correlation 
between growth and all our measures of fractionalization and polarization is milder, 
ranging from -.24 to -.37. 
 
3. Results 
The objective of this section is to revisit the effect of ethnic diversity on economic 
growth. To do so, we estimate the standard augmented Solow model proposed by 
Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992).
11 MRW’s econometric specification is as follows:  
    u g n s s
L
Y
h k + + + - + + = ) ln( ln ln ] ln[ 3 2 1 0 d b b b b     (4) 
where Y/L is output per capita, sk is the rate of investment in physical capital, sh is the 
rate of investment in human capital, n is the population growth rate, g is the rate of 
technological change and δ is the depreciation rate.
12 Subscripts for countries and (the 
four) time periods are omitted. Notice that although the estimation in the original 
MRW  paper  was  done  by  OLS,  we  here  follow  the  more  recent  literature  (e.g., 
McCleary and Barro, 2006) and first estimate (4) using SUR.
13  
  Table 1 has our results treating polarization and fractionalization in a manner 
similar to that of the literature, that is, as exogenous variables. The specifications in 
                                                                                                                                                                      
10  We thank an anonymous referee for this point.   
11  In  the  fractionalization  and  growth  literature,  this  approach  is  used  by,  for  instance, 
Montalvo and Reynal-Queyrol (2003).  
12 We follow MRW in assuming that the sum of g and δ is constant. Although they assume it 
is constant at 5%, here we report results assuming that the sum of rates is 7.5% so as to reflect 
the larger depreciation observed in the capital stocks inherited from the socialist period. 
13  In previous versions of this paper we also reported specifications for the level of per capita 
GDP in the left-had side, instead of the growth rate. Our main results are unaffected by this 
change. In other words, we still find that fractionalization is important vis-à-vis growth only 
when treated as an endogenous variable and its dynamics is taken into account.   10 
Table 1 all include initial income while all of those in Table 2 exclude it.
 Column 1 in 
Table  1  shows  that  the  coefficients  on  investment,  human  capital,  and  population 
carry  their  expected  signs  (positive,  positive  and  negative,  respectively).  Initial 
income is negative, but insignificant.
14 Exogenous ethnic fractionalization, however, 
has  an  almost  negligible  effect  on  growth.
15  Column  2  shows  that  the  ethnic 
fractionalization index has no effect on growth, while columns 3 and 4 show that 
diversity  is  also  not  significant  when  proxied  by  any  of  the  two  versions  of  the 
Alesina et al.’s polarization measure. The same conclusion holds for the Montalvo 
and  Reynal-Querol  measure  (column  5).  These  results  may  well  be  driven,  for 
example,  by  ethnicity  not  being  the  appropriate  dimension  for  conflict  in  these 
countries. In order to address this possibility, we computed two additional indexes. 
First, a principal components index of ethnic, linguistic and religious fractionalization 
dimensions  was  constructed.
  Column  6  reports  these  results  and  shows  that  this 
broader index is also not statistically significant. Second, we constructed an average 
index of these three fractionalization dimensions. Column 7 confirms that diversity is 
still statistically insignificant. 
Table  2  repeats  the  estimations  of  Table  1  but  excluding  initial  income. 
Column 1 shows that the coefficients on investment, human capital, and population 
are now all significant and carry their expected signs (positive, positive, and negative, 
respectively).  However,  the  coefficients  of  all  diversity  indexes  are  still  not 
significant,  except  column  4  which  shows  that  the  ethnic  polarization  index  with 
                                                            
14  There are important data quality issues that should be kept in mind when interpreting these 
results (for a discussion see Campos and Coricelli, 2002). 
15 The results from a standard Granger-causality test show that there is no evidence supporting 
the notion that growth (Granger-) causes diversity. These are available from the authors upon 
request.    11 
a=1.6 is negative and statistically significant.  
In sum, these findings on diversity are in line with most of the recent literature 
in that these estimates show that its direct effect on economic performance is weak. 
One possibility that the literature has not yet explored is that diversity changes over 
time  and  may  also  be  endogenous  (see,  e.g.,  Alesina  and  La  Ferrara,  2005).  Fast 
growing economies will attract migrants, while newly independent states may try to 
expel  formerly  dominant  ethnic  minorities  (say,  Russians).  We  now  turn  to  
econometric results that try to take these possibilities into account. 
In  Table  3,  we  report  our  estimates  of  the  augmented  Solow  model  using 
instrumental  variables  techniques.  These  allow  us  to  treat  ethnic  diversity  as  an 
endogenous  variable.  With  initial  income  in  the  specification,  we  find  that  the 
coefficients on investment, population, and initial income are not significant, although 
the one for human capital is positive and statistically significant. Column 1 shows our 
results  using  dynamic  (endogenous)  diversity:  the  coefficient  on  ethnic 
fractionalization is now negative and significant. Columns 2 and 3 show that for the 
two versions of the Alesina et al.’s polarization measure and for the Montalvo and 
Reynal-Querol’s index (column 4), the coefficients on ethnic fractionalization are also 
negative  and  now  statistically  significant.  Column  5  shows  that  our  principal 
components’  ethnic-linguistic-religious  fractionalization  index  generates  similar 
conclusions, namely that dynamic and endogenous fractionalization seem to have a 
negative and robust first-order effect on economic growth. Column 6 presents similar 
results  for  the  average  of  the  three  diversity  dimensions  (ethnic,  religious  and 
linguistic).  
Table  4  presents  similar  results  but  excluding  initial  income  from  all 
specifications. As it can be seen, the only standard explanatory variable that remains   12 
significant is human capital. For the set of diversity indexes, we can see that all of the 
relevant coefficients are still negative and all except one (out of six) are statistically 
significant.  
Instrument selection is always a difficult matter. It is made more severe in this 
case by the fact that there has been little effort to explain theoretically or empirically 
the evolution of ethnic diversity over time. In this light, we tried a number of variables 
and combinations of variables and settled on the lagged diversity index and latitude 
(the absolute value of distance from the equator).  We subject this choice to extensive 
testing and conclude that these two variables perform satisfactorily. 
We start by examining the Sargan-Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions.  
The objective of this test is to help establish the validity of the instruments, that is, 
that  the  instruments  are  uncorrelated  with  the  residuals  and  that  their  selection  is 
justified.  A rejection of the null hypothesis would suggest that the instruments are not 
valid. As it can be seen in the “diagnostics” panels of Tables 3 and 4, the null is 
rejected in all cases at conventional (95%) confidence levels suggesting that these 
instruments are indeed valid. 
In  terms  of  identification,  next  we  report  on  tests  for  the  relevance  of  the 
instrument set, that is, whether the instruments are correlated with the endogenous 
regressors.  We  report  the  Shea  Partial  R-squared  (with  only  one  endogenous 
regressor, this statistic is equivalent to the more common partial R-square) and the F-
test  of  the  excluded  instruments  in  the  corresponding  first-stage  regression.  The 
results from these two tests support the validity of our set of instruments. The R-
square  figures  are  very  high  and  the  value  of  the  F-statistic  is  above  10  in  all 
specifications of tables 3 and 4. The Anderson canonical correlation likelihood-ratio 
test (CCLR) corroborates these conclusions.     13 
Finally, we also report the Pagan-Hall and RESET tests. The Pagan-Hall tests 
for heteroskedasticity in the IV context. Given the extraordinary variation in growth 
performance across these transition economies over time, some may worry that this 
can be an important source of bias. None of the results in tables 3 and 4 suggest  
heteroskedasticity  problems  in  the  estimated  equations’  disturbance  process.  The 
RESET test we report is the Ramsey's regression error specification test as proposed 
by Pesaran and Taylor (1999). It shows all models in tables 3 and 4 are correctly 
specified in that omitted variables bias does not seem to be severe.  
For the sake of sensitivity analysis, we also apply the Blundell and Bond’s 
(1998)  System  GMM  estimator.  Table  5  presents  GMM  estimations  for  our 
augmented  Solow  model.  The  coefficients  on  investment,  population,  and  human 
capital  are  statistically  insignificant  in  all  specifications  (Table  5).  The  diversity 
indices are treated as exogenous and it can be seen that none of the various versions of 
the index is significant (the fractionalization index in Column 1, the Alesina et al. 
polarization index in column 2, the MRQ index in Column 3, and in columns 4 and 5, 
our two ethnic-linguistic-religious fractionalization indices). Notice that we were not 
able to generate results for the Alesina et al. 1.6 polarization index. Overall, these 
results in table 5 are similar to the one we discussed above in that exogenous diversity 
has no discernible first-order impact on economic growth.  
Table 6 reports System GMM results when diversity is treated as endogenous. 
In  this  case,  the  coefficients  on  human  capital  are  positive  and  now  statistically 
significant. Population and investment are insignificant. Once the diversity indexes 
are treated as endogenous, the coefficients all carry the hypothesized negative sign 
and  are  statistically  significant.  The  instruments  applied  are  the  lagged  dependent 
variable and the latitude
 variable. The system GMM estimator uses as instruments for   14 
the original equation, the first difference of all variables, while for the differenced 
equation,  instruments  are  the  lagged  variables  of  the  original  model.  In  our  case, 
investment,  human  capital,  and  population  are  considered  as  predetermined 
explanatory  variables  which  are  expected  to  be  not  correlated  with  the  past  and 
present value of the errors, while latitude is considered strictly exogenous. Notice that 
the test for the first-order residual serial correlation suggests that the model does not 
suffer  from  serial  correlation.
16  Moreover,  the  validity  of  the  instruments  in  the 
system GMM results is supported by the Hansen test. Note also that we use the two-
step  estimation,  where  the  standard  errors  are  corrected  for  panel  specific  auto-
correlation  and  heteroscedasticity  and  we  also  apply  the  Windmeijer  correction 
(Roodman, 2006).  In our view, we prefer the results in tables 3-4 to those in Tables 
5-6 (that is, we prefer the IV estimates to the System GMM ones) because our panel is 
very short both in terms of countries and especially in terms of time periods. Despite 
the potential problems with the GMM results, it is comforting to see that the main 
conclusions  change  little  compared  to  the  IV  results,  namely,  that  exogenous  and 
static diversity seem to have little effect on growth while the same effect is much 
more statistically robust and economically meaningful from a model that takes into 




This  paper  investigates  a  number  of  questions  related  to  the  behavior  of  ethnic 
diversity  over  time  and  across  countries  and  its  effects  in  terms  of  economic 
                                                            
16   As our panel covers only four periods and we use the one-period lagged diversity as an 
instrument, we are unable us to run the AR(2) test.   15 
performance. We studied how much weight should be attached to the assumption that 
ethnic diversity does not change over time. We noted that this assumption is used 
widely. Paradoxically, the index of ethnic fractionalization that is commonly used in 
the literature was developed by researchers from former communist countries, that 
turn out to experience most dramatic changes in ethnic diversity in a very short period 
of time. We use census or micro-census data to create such indices for four points in 
time for a sample of 26 transition economies. Using these measures, and in line with 
the  recent  literature,  we  find  weak  evidence  of  a  direct  effect  of  diversity  in  the 
standard augmented Solow growth model. On the other hand, our panel estimates 
show  that  dynamic  (endogenous)  ethnic  fractionalization  is  negatively  related  to 
growth, with equally robust results obtaining for measures of ethnic polarization.   
As mentioned above, there are a number of issues that make the situation of 
ethnic groups in the transition countries somewhat special. In our view, those reasons 
support the dramatic changes in the ethnic composition we observe in such a short 
period of time. Although we do not think it is reasonable to expect that changes of this 
magnitude could be observed for other groups of developing countries over ten years 
or so, data may be available that would allow future research to relax the assumption 
that since 1960, that is over the last half-century, the degree of ethnic homogeneity 
has not change meaningfully in poorer countries. Such test can be accomplished, for 
instance, using decade averages of available ethnic diversity measures. This will be 
useful in re-assessing the recent discussion about the channels through which diversity 
(indirectly) affect growth. It is clear, however, that the construction of census-based 
measures for larger samples of developing countries over longer periods of time is 
still a rather demanding task. 
    16 
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SUR Estimation of augmented Solow model with exogenous diversity indices 
(Dependent variable: growth rate of per capita GDP) 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
 


























































  -0.150 
(0.142) 




    -0.414 
(0.379) 




      -0.934 
(0.833) 
     
Polarization 
(MRQ) 
        -0.126 
(0.118) 











            -0.003 
(0.00217) 
-0.347  -0.268  -0.267  -0.234  -0.268  -0.369  -0.258  Constant 
(0.497)  (0.525)  (0.535)  (0.560)  (0.542)  (0.527)  (0.556) 






























Note: SUR estimates. Standard errors in parentheses, * indicates significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, 
*** significant at 1%. 
 


















SUR Estimation of augmented Solow model with exogenous diversity indices and 
without initial income 
(Dependent variable: growth rate GDP per capita) 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
 
0.576***  0.588***  0.586***  0.614***  0.589***  0.539***  Ln I/Y 
(0.143)  (0.145)  (0.146)  (0.142)  (0.146)  (0.151) 
0.314***  0.304**  0.284**  0.252**  0.276**  0.294**  ln HK 
(0.117)  (0.120)  (0.119)  (0.112)  (0.119)  (0.129) 
-0.130**  -0.121*  -0.131**  -0.145**  -0.132**  -0.131*  ln(n+ g+ d) 
(0.0628)  (0.0643)  (0.0634)  (0.0589)  (0.0630)  (0.0669) 
  -0.369          Ethnic 
Fractionalization    (0.290)         
    -0.949        Ethnic 
Polarization(a=0.8)      (0.724)       
      -2.669*      Ethnic 
Polarization(a=1.6)        (1.377)     
        -0.298    Polarization 
 (MRQ)          (0.217)   
          -0.0552  Ethno-linguistic-
religious 
fractionalization 
          (0.0391) 
-0.358  -0.152  -0.0972  0.146  -0.0562  -0.358  Constant 
(0.535)  (0.558)  (0.560)  (0.544)  (0.560)  (0.571) 
Observations  24;24;24;24  24;24;24;24  24;24;24;24  24;24;24;24  24;24;24;24  24;24;24;24 












Note: SUR estimates. Standard errors in parentheses, * indicates significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, 
*** significant at 1%.   20 
 
Table 3 
IV Estimation of augmented Solow model with endogenous diversity indices 
 (Dependent variable: growth rate GDP per capita; 
Instruments used are one-period lagged diversity and latitude) 
                                                    (1)                (2)                 (3)                (4)                (5)                      (6) 




















































         
Ethnic Polarization 
(a=0.8) 
  -0.192*** 
(0.0706) 
       
Ethnic Polarization 
(a=1.6) 
    -0.432*** 
(0.137) 
     
Polarization 
 (MRQ) 
      -0.059*** 
(0.0211) 
   
Ethno-linguistic-
religious fract.   




religious fract. (avg) 
          -0.00101** 
(0.000488) 












Observations  76  76  76  76  76  76 
R-squared  0.285  0.277  0.287  0.278  0.248  0.268 
Diagnostics 


























Shea Partial R-sq  0.8793  0.8395  0.7982  0.8246  0.8992  0.99 
F-statistic  207.74  130.88  56.74  99.26  107.037  100000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Anderson CCLR 





































Note:    Standard  errors  in  parentheses  below  coefficients  and,  in  the  bottom  panel,  p-values  in 
parentheses. * indicates significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.    21 
Table 4 
IV Estimation of augmented Solow model with endogenous diversity indices without initial income 
 (Dependent variable: growth rate GDP per capita; Instruments are lagged diversity and latitude) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
0.0243  0.0269  0.0297*  0.0275  0.0255  0.036*  Ln I/Y 
(0.0169)  (0.0169)  (0.0166)  (0.0168)  (0.0174)  (0.0004) 
0.0450***  0.0444***  0.0425***  0.0444***  0.0468***  0.048***  ln HK 
(0.0128)  (0.0128)  (0.0127)  (0.0128)  (0.0132)  (0.013) 
-0.000267  -0.00130  -0.00249  -0.00162  -0.000887  0.00022  ln(n+ g+ d) 
(0.00528)  (0.00534)  (0.00536)  (0.00535)  (0.00544)  (0.005) 
-0.0889***            Ethnic 
Fractionalization  (0.0331)           
  -0.216***          Ethnic 
Polarization(a=0.8)    (0.0836)         
    -0.469***        Ethnic 
Polarization(a=1.6)      (0.169)       
      -0.067***      Polarization 
 (MRQ)        (0.0254)     
        -0.0112**    Ethnic-linguistic-
religious fract.           (0.00483)   
          -0.001  Ethnic-linguistic-
religious fract. (avg)             (0.00043) 
Constant  -0.0482  -0.0423  -0.0194  -0.0388  -0.0828  -0.0332 
  (0.0569)  (0.0574)  (0.0583)  (0.0575)  (0.0594)  (0.0587) 
Observations  76  76  76  76  76  76 
R-squared  0.280  0.272  0.284  0.273  0.242  0.251 
Diagnostics 
























Shea  Partial R-sq  0.8894  0.8538  0.8208  0.8409  0.9105  0.99 
















































Note: Standard errors in parentheses below coefficients and, in the bottom panel, p-values in 













System GMM Estimation of augmented Solow model with exogenous diversity  
(Dependent variable: growth rate GDP per capita) 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
lagged growth  0.115  0.109  0.118  0.0448  0.00449 
  (0.190)  (0.187)  (0.195)  (0.132)  (0.244) 
Ln I/Y  0.212  0.216  0.216  0.155*  0.284 
  (0.158)  (0.155)  (0.151)  (0.0917)  (0.181) 
Ln HK  0.0449  0.0414  0.0329  0.0334  -0.0084 
  (0.0594)  (0.0588)  (0.0640)  (0.0428)  (0.105) 
Ln(n+ g+ d)  0.125  0.121  0.122  0.0715  0.127 
  (0.120)  (0.115)  (0.116)  (0.0502)  (0.190) 
0.0553  0.0574  0.0600  0.0480  0.0842  Ln Initial income 
(0.0630)  (0.0618)  (0.0640)  (0.0439)  (0.135) 
0.415          Ethnic Fractionalization 
(0.606)         
  0.865        Ethnic Polarization 
(a=0.8)    (1.257)       
    0.268      Polarization 
(MRQ)      (0.387)     
      0.0340    Ethno-linguistic-religious 
fractionalization        (0.0262)   
        0.0118  Ethno-linguistic-religious 
fractionalization (average          (0.0182) 
Observations  76  76  76  76  76 
Number of countries  26  26  26  26  26 
Diagnostics 










Note:   System GMM estimates for growth rate of GDP per capita, 26 transition economies 
between 1989 and 2007.   In the level equation, the instrument used is the first difference of 
the lagged dependent variable. In the transformed equation, the instrument used is the second 
lag  of  the  dependent  variable.  In  the  top panel,  standard errors  are  in  parentheses  and  * 
indicates significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Period dummies are 
always included, not reported, and are all significant at 1% in all specifications  
 
 
   23 
 
Table 6 
System GMM Estimation of augmented Solow model with endogenous diversity  
(Dependent variable: growth rate GDP per capita) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
-0.114  -0.124  -0.140  -0.123  -0.0846  -0.0868  L.lng1 
(0.105)  (0.102)  (0.100)  (0.101)  (0.112)  (0.126) 
-0.00240  0.00121  0.0114  0.00350  -0.00646  0.0180  Ln I/Y 
(0.0210)  (0.0208)  (0.0196)  (0.0202)  (0.0218)  (0.0190) 
0.0603***  0.0618***  0.0536***  0.0592***  0.0665**  0.0436**  Ln HK 
(0.0212)  (0.0217)  (0.0180)  (0.0209)  (0.0270)  (0.0196) 
0.00276  -0.000391  -0.00290  -0.000730  0.00260  0.00654  Ln(n+ g+ d) 
(0.00645)  (0.00773)  (0.00736)  (0.00764)  (0.00669)  (0.00743) 
0.0126  0.0109  0.00665  0.0102  0.0101  0.0178**  Ln Initial income 
(0.00850)  (0.00858)  (0.00786)  (0.00826)  (0.00866)  (0.00839) 
-0.169**            Ethnic 
Fractionalization  (0.0788)           
  -0.483**          Ethnic Polarization 
(a=0.8)    (0.216)         
    -1.036**        Ethnic Polarization 
(a=1.6)      (0.402)       
      -0.142**      Polarization 
(MRQ)        (0.0628)     
        -.0206*    Ethno-linguistic-
religious 
fractionalization 
        (0.0116)   




          (0.000557) 
Constant  -0.193  -0.174  -0.0686  -0.151  -0.257*  -0.157 
  (0.122)  (0.123)  (0.0991)  (0.117)  (0.142)  (0.122) 
Observations  76  76  76  76  76  76 
Number of 
countries 
26  26  26  26  26  26 
Diagnostics 
























Note: System GMM estimates for growth rate of GDP per capita, 26 transition economies between 1989 
and 2007. In the level equation, the instruments used are time dummies and latitude, the first differenced 
of the dependent variable, investment, human capital, population, and the first difference of the lagged 
fractionalization  index.  In  the  transformed  equation,  the  instruments  used  are  the  first  difference  of 
latitude,  lagged  dependent  variable,  investment,  human  capital,  population  and  second  lag    of  the 
respective fractionalization index. In the top panel, standard errors are in parentheses and * indicates 
significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Period dummies are always included, not 
reported, and are all significant at 1% in all specifications.    24 
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Appendix 1  
Correlation matrix 
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Log Human Capital  -0.0985 
               
Log Investment  -0.0906 
  0.2606             
Ethnic 
Fractionalization  0.0727  0.0057  -0.0982           
Ethnic 
Polarization(a=0.8)  -0.0140  0.0042  -0.0477  0.9771         
Ethnic 
Polarization(a=1.6)  -0.1021  -0.0179  0.0170  0.8629  0.9319       
Polarization 




-0.0292  0.0824  -0.0723  0.9174  0.9108  0.8301  0.9028   
Growth rate 
GPD per capita  -0.1110  0.1981  0.0059  -0.3788  -0.3657  -0.3710  -0.3605  -0.2457 